“COLLEGIAL RULE” FOR
“GOOD GOVERNANCE”
Collegial
rule promotes “good governance” because it provides for proficiency,
integrity and accountability in making and implementing policies and programs
of government.
Firstly,
collegial rule by its inherent nature harnesses Collegial wisdom. It
extrapolates to a higher level the idiom “two heads are better than one.”
[PROFICIENCY]
Secondly,
collegial rule impedes graft and corruption because its group-based
mechanism necessarily requires the disclosure of material information to many
individuals. As human experience shows, “corruption thrives in secrecy, and
withers in the light.” [INTEGRITY]
Thirdly,
collegial rule strengthens accountability because it separates the
“exercise of power” from the “ultimate hold on power.” As political reality
shows, the individual with delegated authority to exercise executive power,
routinely defers to the Collegial will of the assembly of elected
representatives, because this body holds the ultimate authority to
hire-and-fire him. [ACCOUNTABILITY]
Collegial rule also
promotes consensus building, because it pre-supposes or necessarily requires
the support of a majority to gain and retain political power. On the other
hand, one-man rule may promote authoritarianism, because power may be
gained by mere plurality of votes (i.e. a minority vote vis-à-vis the
total votes), and may be retained despite overwhelming opposition, because the
usual remedies for removal are either ineffective or impossible.
Collegial rule by majority
vote in Collegial decision making, is the standard in a parliamentary system
(at the national level) and in a council type system (at the local level). It
is the opposite of one-man rule by an individual decision maker, which is
the virtual standard in a presidential system (at the national level) and in a
mayor type system (at the local level).
Following
the American presidential system with separation of powers, the single
individual who becomes president and assumes one-man rule, takes full
control of the entire executive branch; appoints all the justices and judges of
the judicial branch; enjoys immunity or cannot be sued while in office; and
cannot be removed from office, except by impeachment (i.e. an ineffective legal
remedy) or people’s power (i.e. a practical impossibility). This is the sad and
sorry state of politics in the Philippines which undoubtedly needs to be
revisited, re-examined and restructured.
On the other hand, in the British
parliamentary system that adopts collegial rule, the political branches
of the executive and the legislature are merged, but leaves separate and
independent the non-political branch of the judiciary. Accordingly, an
effective mechanism for checks-and-balances is retained, notwithstanding the
merger of executive and legislative branches of government. This is a working
system of government, where some (not necessarily all) features may be
considered and adopted by the Philippines.
Collegial
rule weakens the control or influence of the oligarchs and the family
dynasties over the government, by dispersing the ultimate power of control from
one individual to an assembly of elected representatives. At the same time, it
strengthens the government vis-a-vis the powerful vested interests, by
consolidating the law-making and law-execution powers in the assembly of
representatives.
Furthermore,
collegial rule diminishes the natural
advantage of “rich and famous” candidates over competent but underfunded and
unknown candidates, through “voting by district” in multiple small
constituencies, instead of “voting at large” in one big constituency.
Notably, a manipulative mass media is less effective in small constituencies,
because here the voter has greater chances of knowing the real qualities of the
candidate.[i]
Moreover, the selection process involving multiple small constituencies
requires a substantially lower number of votes to win the post of chief
executive.[ii]
Finally,
collegial rule makes the chief
executive more readily removable for acts or omissions involving fault or
negligence, through a mere vote of “loss of confidence” in the assembly of
elected representatives, rather than through an impeachment trial,
administrative proceeding or criminal prosecution.
Does
collegial rule have any known disadvantage or systemic weakness? Yes, it
does. The mechanism to easily hire-and-fire the chief executive may cause
instability. Can this be avoided? Yes, it can.
Since
the chief executive is ordinarily removable at any time by majority vote of the
members of the elective assembly for mere loss of confidence, there can be
frequent changes in political leaders over short durations like every few
months or years. Changes in political leaders usually involve changes in
policy. This results in the unpredictability of government that eventually
hampers business and economic activity.
Nonetheless,
this systemic weakness may be addressed by modifying the mechanism to
hire-and-fire the chief executive. The modified method can make it easy to
“hire” the chief executive (such as by simple majority vote), but at the same
time, difficult to “fire” him (such as by qualified 2/3 majority vote). Once
elected, the chief executive may then hold the position until the expiration or
termination of his membership in the elective assembly, or until he is earlier
removed from office by higher or qualified majority vote.
Accordingly,
by modifying the method to hire-and-fire the chief executive, the people may
enjoy the benefits of collegial rule, without the disadvantage of
political instability.
This material was written ex-gratia by Demosthenes
B. Donato
for Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc.
All intellectual property rights are granted to the
public domain.
10 May 2021. Makati City, Philippines.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in
this material are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of TanDem.
[i]
The electoral process for public officials needs to be designed in a manner
that is immune from any deliberate manipulation of public opinion by mass
media, considering that many television stations, radio stations, broadsheets,
tabloids and online news sites, are by common knowledge owned or influenced by
the oligarchs and the family dynasties.
[ii]
For example, in a state with 10,000,000 voters and
only 2 candidates, a candidate needs 5,000,000 + 1 votes to win as president
(chief executive), assuming that all voters vote in a “presidential system”
with direct voting. On the other hand, in a “parliamentary system” assuming 100
districts with 100,000 voters per district, the party of a candidate for prime
minister (chief executive) needs to win only 51 seats in the parliament
(national assembly). This would be 2,550,000 + 51 (or 50,000 + 1 per district)
or total of 2,550,051 votes only, assuming all voters in all districts vote.
Another example, in a town with 10,000 voters and only 2
candidates, a candidate needs 5,000 + 1 votes to win as mayor, assuming that
all voters vote in a “mayor type system”. On the other hand, in a “council type
system” assuming 10 districts with 1,000 voters per district, the party of a
mayoralty candidate needs to win only 6 seats in the council. This would be
3,000 + 6 (or 500 + 1 per district) or total of 3,006 votes only, assuming all
voters in all districts vote.
