Friday, October 30, 2020

"Collegial Rule" for "Good Governance"

 

“COLLEGIAL RULE” FOR

“GOOD GOVERNANCE”

 

 

            Collegial rule promotes “good governance” because it provides for proficiency, integrity and accountability in making and implementing policies and programs of government.

 

            Firstly, collegial rule by its inherent nature harnesses Collegial wisdom. It extrapolates to a higher level the idiom “two heads are better than one.” [PROFICIENCY]

 

            Secondly, collegial rule impedes graft and corruption because its group-based mechanism necessarily requires the disclosure of material information to many individuals. As human experience shows, “corruption thrives in secrecy, and withers in the light.” [INTEGRITY]

 

            Thirdly, collegial rule strengthens accountability because it separates the “exercise of power” from the “ultimate hold on power.” As political reality shows, the individual with delegated authority to exercise executive power, routinely defers to the Collegial will of the assembly of elected representatives, because this body holds the ultimate authority to hire-and-fire him. [ACCOUNTABILITY]

 

Collegial rule also promotes consensus building, because it pre-supposes or necessarily requires the support of a majority to gain and retain political power. On the other hand, one-man rule may promote authoritarianism, because power may be gained by mere plurality of votes (i.e. a minority vote vis-à-vis the total votes), and may be retained despite overwhelming opposition, because the usual remedies for removal are either ineffective or impossible.

 

Collegial rule by majority vote in Collegial decision making, is the standard in a parliamentary system (at the national level) and in a council type system (at the local level). It is the opposite of one-man rule by an individual decision maker, which is the virtual standard in a presidential system (at the national level) and in a mayor type system (at the local level).

 

            Following the American presidential system with separation of powers, the single individual who becomes president and assumes one-man rule, takes full control of the entire executive branch; appoints all the justices and judges of the judicial branch; enjoys immunity or cannot be sued while in office; and cannot be removed from office, except by impeachment (i.e. an ineffective legal remedy) or people’s power (i.e. a practical impossibility). This is the sad and sorry state of politics in the Philippines which undoubtedly needs to be revisited, re-examined and restructured.

 

On the other hand, in the British parliamentary system that adopts collegial rule, the political branches of the executive and the legislature are merged, but leaves separate and independent the non-political branch of the judiciary. Accordingly, an effective mechanism for checks-and-balances is retained, notwithstanding the merger of executive and legislative branches of government. This is a working system of government, where some (not necessarily all) features may be considered and adopted by the Philippines.

 

            Collegial rule weakens the control or influence of the oligarchs and the family dynasties over the government, by dispersing the ultimate power of control from one individual to an assembly of elected representatives. At the same time, it strengthens the government vis-a-vis the powerful vested interests, by consolidating the law-making and law-execution powers in the assembly of representatives.

 

Furthermore, collegial rule diminishes the natural advantage of “rich and famous” candidates over competent but underfunded and unknown candidates, through “voting by district” in multiple small constituencies, instead of “voting at large” in one big constituency. Notably, a manipulative mass media is less effective in small constituencies, because here the voter has greater chances of knowing the real qualities of the candidate.[i] Moreover, the selection process involving multiple small constituencies requires a substantially lower number of votes to win the post of chief executive.[ii]

 

Finally, collegial rule makes the chief executive more readily removable for acts or omissions involving fault or negligence, through a mere vote of “loss of confidence” in the assembly of elected representatives, rather than through an impeachment trial, administrative proceeding or criminal prosecution.

           

Does collegial rule have any known disadvantage or systemic weakness? Yes, it does. The mechanism to easily hire-and-fire the chief executive may cause instability. Can this be avoided? Yes, it can.

 

Since the chief executive is ordinarily removable at any time by majority vote of the members of the elective assembly for mere loss of confidence, there can be frequent changes in political leaders over short durations like every few months or years. Changes in political leaders usually involve changes in policy. This results in the unpredictability of government that eventually hampers business and economic activity.

 

Nonetheless, this systemic weakness may be addressed by modifying the mechanism to hire-and-fire the chief executive. The modified method can make it easy to “hire” the chief executive (such as by simple majority vote), but at the same time, difficult to “fire” him (such as by qualified 2/3 majority vote). Once elected, the chief executive may then hold the position until the expiration or termination of his membership in the elective assembly, or until he is earlier removed from office by higher or qualified majority vote.

 

            Accordingly, by modifying the method to hire-and-fire the chief executive, the people may enjoy the benefits of collegial rule, without the disadvantage of political instability.

 

 

 

This material was written ex-gratia by Demosthenes B. Donato

for Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc.

All intellectual property rights are granted to the public domain.

10 May 2021. Makati City, Philippines.

 

 

 Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this material are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of TanDem.

 



[i] The electoral process for public officials needs to be designed in a manner that is immune from any deliberate manipulation of public opinion by mass media, considering that many television stations, radio stations, broadsheets, tabloids and online news sites, are by common knowledge owned or influenced by the oligarchs and the family dynasties.

 

[ii] For example, in a state with 10,000,000 voters and only 2 candidates, a candidate needs 5,000,000 + 1 votes to win as president (chief executive), assuming that all voters vote in a “presidential system” with direct voting. On the other hand, in a “parliamentary system” assuming 100 districts with 100,000 voters per district, the party of a candidate for prime minister (chief executive) needs to win only 51 seats in the parliament (national assembly). This would be 2,550,000 + 51 (or 50,000 + 1 per district) or total of 2,550,051 votes only, assuming all voters in all districts vote.

 

Another example, in a town with 10,000 voters and only 2 candidates, a candidate needs 5,000 + 1 votes to win as mayor, assuming that all voters vote in a “mayor type system”. On the other hand, in a “council type system” assuming 10 districts with 1,000 voters per district, the party of a mayoralty candidate needs to win only 6 seats in the council. This would be 3,000 + 6 (or 500 + 1 per district) or total of 3,006 votes only, assuming all voters in all districts vote.

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